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Abstract
A version of the Diamond-Dybvig model of banking is used to evaluate the
narrow banking proposal, the idea that banks should be required to back demand
deposits entirely by safe short-term assets. It is shown that the mere existence of
an amount of safe short-term assets outside the banking system that exceeds
bankingsystem liabilities does not make the proposal either innocuous or desirable.
In fact, despite such existence, using narrow banking to cope with banking system
illiquidity eliminates the role of the banking system.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The current version of the 100 percent–reserve banking
proposal, called the narrow banking proposal, begins with
an observation: The magnitude of safe short-term assets
outside the banking system exceeds the magnitude of
banks’ demand deposit liabilities. Therefore, say the pro-
ponents of narrow banking, why not avoid the problems
of an illiquid banking system portfolio—such as the threat
of bank runs and the accompanying need for deposit in-
surance, regulation, and bailouts—by forcing a rearrange-
ment of asset holdings in the economy? Why not require
that demand depositsbe backed entirely by safe short-term
assets? This is the narrow banking proposal.
1 However,
this proposal both begins and ends with the same observa-
tion. That is, there is no theory or model of banking from
which the proposal emerges. In particular, no model is of-
fered which is consistent with the pervasiveness of illiquid
banking systems and which also implies that the narrow
banking proposal is desirable. This is a serious omission,
for two reasons: the supposed problem that the narrow
bankingproposal is intendedto solvewould not existif the
bankingsystemwerenotilliquid,andanexplanationinthe
form of a theory or model of illiquid banking systems is
likely to suggest that beneﬁts accompany such systems.
Models do exist, built on Diamond and Dybvig 1983,
that are consistent with illiquid banking. These models of-
fer a plausible explanation of the role played by an illiquid
banking system; the explanation suggests that some bene-
ﬁts accompany banking system illiquidity. Although the
original version of the model seems ill-suited to address
the narrow banking proposal because, in that version, the
banking system holds all the assets in the economy, sim-
ple extensions of the model may be made that are consis-
tent with assets being held outside the banking system. It
is presumably such extensions that Diamond and Dybvig
have in mind in their critical discussions of the narrow
banking proposal. (See Diamond and Dybvig 1986 and
Dybvig 1993.) Diamond and Dybvig say that the proposal
makes sense only if the safe short-term assets outside the
banking system in the actual economy represent excess
liquidity,a factwhichthey doubt.Therefore, Diamondand
Dybvig suggest, implementation of the narrow banking
proposal would have undesirable consequences.
My purpose here is simply to make Diamond and
Dybvig’s argument explicit. I set out a version of the Dia-
mond-Dybvig model and point out what the model im-
plies about the narrow banking proposal. My version of
the model supports their position: there can be large
amounts of safe short-term assets outside the banking sys-
tem, but narrow banking is undesirable. It is undesirable
relative to something that bears some resemblance to our
current banking system and undesirable relative to some-
thing resembling, if anything, a banking system with a
large amount of liabilities subordinate to its demand de-
posit liabilities.
Of course,for avariety ofreasons,advocatesof thenar-
row banking proposal may be skeptical of this version of
the Diamond-Dybvig model and, therefore, skeptical of its
implications for their proposal. As with any banking mod-
el, this one does not capture some features of actual bank-
ing systems. Such skepticism, though, is hardly a persua-
sive argument for the narrow banking proposal. Any pro-
posal for a major change in policy should be supported by
a coherent view of the phenomenon under consideration.
In this case, the phenomenon is illiquid banking. Such a
view should imply that the policy is desirable, and such a
proposal should argue that its view of the phenomenon
shouldbeaccepted.Theadvocatesofnarrowbankinghave
not even begun this process of argumentation. Not only
have advocates of narrow banking not made a case, but
some of them seem unaware that a plausible model of il-




Before examining the model, I will review a few basic
concepts. The term illiquid banking system refers to a
property of a consolidated balance sheet. The consolida-
tion is over banks and may also include the central bank,
the government, and even those in debt to banks. The il-
liquidity property of this balance sheet means that not all
banking system obligations can be met if all holders of
those obligations simultaneously claim what they have
been promised. More generally, if the obligations are de-
posits that give the owners of the deposits the right to de-
cide when to withdraw, then the banking system is illiquid
if there is some possible pattern of withdrawals that can-
not be accommodated. The most typical example of such
a system is a fractional reserve banking system under a
commodity standard such as the gold standard. Such a
banking system has demand liabilities that exceed its re-
serves (in the form of the commodity standard).
3
Banking system illiquidity seems to open the door to
potential difficulties, and history is rife with instances of
what are variously called bank panics or bank runs, which
are generally viewed as realizations of the potential diffi-
culties (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). Are these realiza-
tions inevitable? Can they be avoided, and at what cost?
The narrow banking proposal says, Let’s eliminate the po-
tential difficulties by eliminating illiquid banks. That may
be a good idea, or it may be silly—as silly as a proposal to
reduceautomobileaccidentsbylimitingautomobilespeeds
to zero. Here I will appraise the narrow banking proposal
using a model.
Why use a model? The alternatives are to look at histo-
ry or to try an experiment using the narrow banking pro-
posal. As far as history is concerned, even if narrow bank-
ing had been in effect in the past, without a model we
would not even know what to look for to judge narrow
banking’s success or failure. The same difficulty arises
when we consider an experiment. Moreover, experiment-
ing on the actual economy may be very costly, particular-
ly if narrow banking is not, in fact, a good idea. Using a
model amounts to experimenting on an analog of the actu-
al economy. Such experimentation is much cheaper, main-
ly because it avoids the risks of experimenting on the ac-
tual economy.
A Version of the Diamond-Dybvig Model
We want a plausible model that explains illiquid banking
and lets us judge how people will be affected by various
rules imposed on the banking system. Such a model is set
out here.
4 The model has three main ingredients, each of
which, as will be explained below, is plausible:
• Individual uncertainty about desired time proﬁles of
consumption,includingtheassumption(referredtoas
private information uncertainty) that realizations ofthis uncertainty are known to the person, but not to
others.
• Investmenttechnologies thatoffera trade-offbetween
those with good short-term returns and those with
good long-term returns.
• Isolation of people from each other in a way that,
among other things, forces the banking system to deal
with depositors on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis.
The ﬁrst ingredient, individual uncertainty, gives rise to
a role for assets that can be cashed in at the request of the
holder—something like actual demand deposit and sav-
ings deposit accounts. This ingredient is plausible in that
such uncertainty has long been used to explain why peo-
ple do not plan the pattern of their expenditures so as to
avoid holding low-return assets such as checking accounts
and traveler’s checks. The second ingredient, investment
technologies that offer a trade-off between short-term and
long-term technologies, makes it easy to have both bank-
ing system illiquidity and safe short-term assets outside
thebankingsystem.Thisingredientseemseminentlyplau-
sible as a feature of technologies in actual economies. The
thirdingredient,isolationthatforcesﬁrst-come,ﬁrst-served
treatment of depositors, is also plausible—if only because
something like it is necessary to account for the dominant
role of the ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served principle in almost all
retail trade.
When the above ingredients are combined in a way
that produces a model of a complete economy, I am able
to describe what is feasible in that economy as well as
which feasible things are desirable. Desirability will be
judged by the extent to which people’s preferences are
satisﬁed—preferences that take into account the uncertain-
ty people face about desired time proﬁles of consumption.
According to the model, a best feasible outcome has fea-
tures that resemble these:
• Demand deposits.
• An illiquid banking system where the consolidation
is best viewed as over banks and over those indebted
to banks.
• Safe assets outside the banking system.
This is the sense in which the model explains an illiquid
banking system that has safe assets outside the banking
system.
The model is essentially the same as the one in Dia-
mond-Dybvig 1983. There are three dates indexed by t,
where t = 0, 1, 2, and there is one good per date. The
economy is endowed with only date 0 good, an amount
that is normalized, per person, to unity. There are two lin-
ear constant returns-to-scale technologies. There is a short-
term technology with gross return R1; output at t + 1 per
unit input into this technology at t is R1. There is a long-
term technology with gross two-period return R2; output
at t + 2 per unit input into this technology at t is R2. There
is also a return for liquidation of investment in the long-
term technology after one period; this gross return is de-
noted r1. I assume R2 >( R 1)
2>( r 1)
2> 0, so that, accord-
ing to the technology, it is best to provide for date 2 con-
sumption by investment in the long-term technology and
to provide for date 1 consumption by investment in the
short-term technology.
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At date 0 there are a large number of identical people,
and each person is uncertain about what his or her prefer-
ences over consumption at dates 1 and 2 will be. Those
preferences may be of an impatient type, labeled type 1,
or of a patient type, labeled type 2. At the beginning of
date 1, each person learns his or her type. This is private
information; a person’s type is known to that person, but
not to anyone else. The preferences of each type 1 (impa-
tient) person after learning his or her type are given by the
utility function u
1(x,y), while the preferences of each type
2 (patient) person are given by the utility function u
2(x,y),
where in both functions x is date 1 consumption and y is
date 2 consumption. The accompanying chart depicts the
relationship between the utility functions of the two types
using indifference curves. The chart indicates that, at any
consumption pair, each impatient person is willing to sac-
riﬁce less of date 1 consumption, per unit of additional
date 2 consumption, than is a patient person; that is, at any
consumptionpair,theimpatientindifferencecurvethrough
that pair is steeper than that of the patient indifference
curve through that pair.
6
We let p be both the fraction of people who will turn
out to be impatient and the subjective probability at date
0 that each person will be impatient. Welfare is judged at
date 0 by the magnitude of expected utility, pu
1(x,y)+
(1–p)u
2(x,y). Finally, I assume that people are isolated
from each other at date 1, so that at date 1 they cannot get
together and coordinate what they do, and so that, if a
banking system exists, then it must accommodate with-
drawal demands at date 1 sequentially, one person at a
time.
7
Implications of the Model
Before I use the model to appraise narrow banking, I de-
scribe some of its other relevant implications.
The Best Feasible Symmetric Outcome





2) for i = 1, 2 be a symmetric alloca-
tion—symmetric in the sense that everyone at date 0 is
given the same type-contingent consumption pairs, where
the subscript represents the date and the superscript i rep-
resents the type. In other words, a symmetric allocation is
a consumption pair for each type. The solution to the fol-
lowing problem is the best feasible symmetric outcome.
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for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, where xs is investment per person
at date 0 in the short-term technology, xl is investment per
person at date 0 in the long-term technology, and xl1 is the
amount per person of long-term investment liquidated at
date 1.Conditions (1)–(4) are resource constraints. Constraint
(1) says that total investment cannot exceed the initial
amount of date 0 good in the economy. Constraint (2)
says that total date 1 consumption cannot exceed the re-
turns on investment, which consist of the return on the
short-term investment plus the return on the amount of
long-term investment liquidated at date 1. Constraint (3)
says that total date 2 consumption cannot exceed the date
2 returns on investment, which consist of the return on
long-term investment not liquidated at date 1 plus the re-
turn on short-term investment made at date 1. Constraint
(4) says that the total liquidated long-term investment is
bounded above by long-term investment. Constraint (5) is
calledanindividualincentivecompatibilityconstraint.This
constraint says that for each type, the consumption pair
designated for that type should give at least as much util-
ity as the consumption pair designated for the other type.
Constraint (5) is required because of the assumption that
knowledge of type is private information. Under that as-
sumption, it is well known that any achievable allocation
must satisfy such an incentive constraint.
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The preceding problem is called an upper bound prob-
lem because it does not include a constraint dealing with
sequential service. Despite this, I will show that the solu-
tion to the problem is achievable. Thus I begin by describ-
ing some properties of the solution.
PROPOSITION 1. Any solution to the upper bound problem
is such that all date 1 consumption is supported by invest-
ment in the short-term technology and all date 2 con-
sumption is supported by investment in the long-term tech-
nology (so that there is no liquidation of long-term invest-
ment), constraints (1)–(3) hold at equality, and type 1( im-
patient) persons receive relatively more date 1 consump-
tion and relatively less date 2 consumption than type 2









an asterisk denotes a solution.)
The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix.
The investment claims are obvious, given that there is no
uncertainty about the total amount of consumption at each
date. The claims about the consumption pairs follow from
the difference in preferences and the incentive constraints.
Next I argue that the solution to the upper bound prob-
lem can be achieved. This is done in two steps. First, I
show that if all resources have been invested at date 0 ac-
cording to the solution to the upper bound problem, then
each person is willing at date 1 to receive the solution pair
intended for his or her true type, no matter what declara-
tions of type that person thinks others may make. Second,
I show that individual defection at date 0 from the upper
bound solution is not in any person’s interest.
Let N denote the total number of people. It is known
that Np are truly impatient and N(1–p) are truly patient.
Suppose people who show up at date 1 to declare their
type are given a choice between the consumption pair in-
tended for type 1 and the pair intended for type 2, until
the number claiming to be a particular type is equal to
what is known to be the true number of that type; after
that, each person is given the consumption pair for the
other type.9 This scheme, which is a kind of suspension
scheme, assures that Np people will end up with the con-
sumption pair intended for type 1 people and N(1–p) peo-
ple will end up with the pair intended for type 2 people.
Therefore,thisschemeassuresthateachpersonwhoshows
up to declare his or her type at date 1 early enough to have
a choice will be faced with two and only two options: the
pair intended for type 1 and the pair intended for type 2—
no matter what those who showed up earlier have declared
and no matter what those who show up later will declare.
It follows, then, from the individual incentive compatibili-
ty constraint—constraint (5)—that each such person who
has a choice will truthfully declare his or her type. There-
fore, each such person will receive the consumption pair
intended for his or her true type.
To consider possible defection at date 0, suppose that
each person begins with one unit of the date 0 good. I now
show that no one would like to depart from a mutual ar-
rangement in which each contributes (deposits) one unit
at date 0 and receives in exchange a promise of the two
consumption pairs that solve the upper bound problem. To
show this I must describe what is received by a person
whodefects.Undermyassumptionsaboutisolationatdate
1, each person who defects is entirely on his or her own,
a situation described by the term autarky. The best such
a person can do in this situation is receive the consump-
tion pairs that solve the following problem.




2) for i = 1, 2 and choose
xs, xl, and x
i











2), subject to (1) and to
(6) c
i

















l1 is the amount of long-term investment liquidated
at date 1 in the event that a person turns out to be type i
and where each of conditions (6)–(8) holds for i =1 ,2 .
I now prove Proposition 2, which assures that there
will be no defection.
PROPOSITION2. Any solution to the upper bound problem
is better than the solution to the autarky problem.
The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix.
There are two steps to the argument: (a) The consumption
4-tuple that solves the autarky problem is feasible for the
upper bound problem, and (b) any consumption 4-tuple
that solves the upper bound problem is not feasible under
autarky. Step (a) is demonstrated by showing that satisfac-
tion of (6)–(8) for each i implies satisfaction of the con-
straints of the upper bound problem. Step (b) is demon-
strated by showing that the autarky constraints are incon-
sistent with different consumption pairs for the two types,
with all date 1 consumption ﬁnanced by investment in the
short-term technology, and with all date 2 consumption ﬁ-
nanced by investment in the long-term technology.
Proposition 2 says that in this model there are gains to
be made through trade. One source of gain comes from ﬁ-
nancing all date 1 consumption by the short-term technol-
ogy and all date 2 consumption by the long-term technol-
ogy; this can happen under autarky only if the consump-
tion pair does not vary with a person’s type—a consump-
tion outcome which, as shown above, is never best for the
upper bound problem. In addition, for given investments,
trade permits more possibilities for the consumption pairs
for the two types than are possible under autarky. This isthe only source of gain in the original version of the Dia-
mond-Dybvig model; that version has a single investment
technology.
Assets Outside the Banking System
I have described a way to achieve the upper bound solu-
tion by means of a banking system which holds all the
wealth in the economy and which has liabilities consisting
entirely of deposits. I now explain how, when assets are
held outside the banking system, this optimum can be
achieved in other ways.
As Jacklin (1987) notes, bank deposits such as those
discussed in the previous section are somewhat unusual
becausetheyarenotpermittedtobecompletelywithdrawn
at either date. Jacklin shows that there is a simple way to
change the portfolios to permit complete withdrawal at
each date. The amended portfolios are of special interest
here because they imply that there are assets outside the
banking system.
According to Proposition 1, each person is consuming
at least c
2
1* at date 1 and at least c
1
2* at date 2. Thus the
optimal consumption pairs can be supported by the fol-
lowing date 0 arrangement. Each person individually in-
vests c
2
1*/R1 in the short-term technology, invests c
1
2*/R2 in
the long-term technology, and invests the remainder with




1*)/R1 per person in





son in the long-term technology. It offers each depositor









date 2. When combined with the suspension procedure
described above, this scheme achieves the optimum in the
same sense as does the scheme in which the bank holds
all the assets in the economy.
According to the model, the maximum magnitude of
assets outside the banking system relative to assets inside
the banking system is determined by the degree of differ-
ence between the two types of persons. If the types are
not very different (in the sense that the difference between
the slopes of their indifference curves at any consumption
pair are small), then the consumption pairs that solve the
upper bound problem are not very different and most as-
sets can be held outside the banking system. An interpre-
tation of a small difference between types is that the mag-
nitude of uncertainty for each person about the desired
timing of consumption is small relative to average con-
sumption.
The sense in which this model accounts for assets out-
side the banking system is precisely the possibility that the
solution to the upper bound problem is achieved as just
described, with total assets outside the banking system as




2*/R2)—or with almost that
amount outside the banking system. As I noted, this
amount, relative to assets in the banking system, can be
small or large depending on how different are the prefer-
ences. The amount invested in the short-term technology,
or an amount almost that large, is the model’s analog of
the observation that inspires the current version of the nar-
row banking proposal, namely, the existence of safe short-
term assets outside the banking system. However, before
I use the model to discuss the narrow banking proposal,
I must ﬁrst consider a potential special role for the invest-
ment in long-term technology—investment that provides
the minimum amount of date 2 consumption that each
person receives according to the upper bound solution.
This minimum amount is equal to Nc
1
2*/R2.
Such investment could be held by the banking system
and be matched by a liability that is distinct from depos-
its—a liability that does not give the holder the option to
withdraw the liability at date 1. Moreover, such a liability
could be made subordinate to the deposit liabilities, in the
sense that such claims are paid at date 2 only after all de-
posit claims against the bank, both at date 1 and at date 2,
have been satisﬁed. It seems clear that a sufficient amount
of such assets can substitute for suspension as a way of
reassuring the patient (type 2) persons. (See Drees 1989,
De Nicolo 1995.) Suspension reassures those who turn out
to be patient that their promised date 2 payouts will, in
fact, be made. A different way to reassure them is for the
bank to hold sufficient assets, the claims on which are
subordinate to deposit claims. The investment equal to
Nc
1
2*/R2 can play the role of such assets. If the consump-
tion pairs that solve the upper bound problem are not too
different from one another, then such a scheme can fully
reassure depositors because potential liquidations will per-
mit the banking system to meet any pattern of deposit
withdrawals. When depositors are reassured in this way,
each person will withdraw in accord with his or her true
type and there will be no actual liquidations. Notice that
the investment supporting the minimum amount of date 1
consumption, Nc
2
1*/R1, cannot play such a role because it
is needed at date 1. However, Nc
2
1*/R1 is the model’s ana-
log of the investment outside the banking system (the safe
short-term assets) on which the narrow banking proposal
focuses.
The Narrow Banking Proposal
I now use the model to interpret and appraise the narrow
banking proposal. In my model each person as of date 0
has the same deposit, a deposit which gives that person
certain withdrawal options. Given those options, and con-
sistent with my earlier deﬁnition of illiquidity, I will say
that the banking system is liquid if it can accommodate
any pattern of withdrawals and is illiquid otherwise. That
is, the quality of liquidity or illiquidity is a property of the
banking system at date 0. The system is liquid if its asset
holdings at date 0 and its promises to depositors are such
that it can meet any pattern of withdrawals, not just the
pattern that is consistent with truthful declaration of types.
I will interpret the narrow banking proposal as one requir-
ing the banking system to be liquid without any reliance
on liabilities subordinate to deposits.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that any feasible allocation
consistent with such a liquid banking system is achievable
under autarky. In that sense the narrow banking proposal
eliminates the banking system. Proposition 3 also demon-
strates that any banking system without liabilities subordi-
nate to deposits, which accomplishes anything relative to
autarky, and which,in particular,achieves the upperbound
solution, is an illiquid banking system.
PROPOSITION 3. If the banking system has no liabilities
subordinate to its deposit liabilities and is liquid, then the
implied consumption pairs are achievable under autarky.
The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix.
The idea behind it is that if the banking system has to be
able to meet any pattern of withdrawals, including every-
one claiming to be impatient and everyone claiming to bepatient, and has no liabilities subordinate to deposits, then
it is in the situation of an individual acting alone.
Proposition 3 is the model’s criticism of narrow bank-
ing. It shows that in this model narrow banking eliminates
therole ofbanking. Theproposition impliesthat usingnar-
row banking to cope with the potential problems of bank-
ing illiquidity is analogous to reducing automobile acci-
dents by limiting automobile speeds to zero.
Concluding Remarks
Theresultsgivenaboveareonlyasconvincingasthemod-
el from which they are derived. It is relevant, therefore, to
compare this model to other ways of explaining banking
system illiquidity. It is also relevant to consider discrepan-
cies between the model and the actual economy.
As far as I know, there are only two other explanations
of illiquid banking system portfolios. Calomiris and Kahn
(1991) explain a bank liability payable on demand as a
device to keep bankers from embezzling funds. The other
explanation is that banking system illiquidity is the result
of risk-taking incentives generated by public policies—
policies like improperly priced deposit insurance and cen-
tral bank last resort lending. In contrast, the Diamond-
Dybvig explanation rests on individual uncertainty about
desired time proﬁles for consumption and a trade-off be-
tween technologies that give good short-term and long-
term rates of return. The embezzlement explanation seems
better suited to explaining terms of loans to small ﬁrms
than to explaining the form of deposits at banks, while the
public policy explanation seems inconsistent with the per-
vasiveness of banking system illiquidity. In any case, these
different explanations are not mutually exclusive. As long
as a model assigns some role to the very plausible ingredi-
ents of the Diamond-Dybvig explanation, the criticism of
narrow banking given here still applies.
There are at least three notable discrepancies between
the model set out here and the actual economy. First, al-
though the deposits in the model are similar to savings de-
posits and demand deposits in the actual economy (in that
withdrawal is at the request of the depositor), deposits in
the model do not serve as vehicles for making third-party
payments, as do demand deposits in the actual economy.
The signiﬁcance of this omission is hard to judge because
there are no plausible models in which transacting is diffi-
cult and where assets that resemble deposits play a role in
overcoming the difficulties.
Second, although I show that one asset arrangement
which is consistent with the model’s best symmetric allo-
cation has assets outside the banking system and an illiq-
uid banking system portfolio, that arrangement is not the
only one which is consistent with the model’s best feasi-
ble symmetric allocation. The model determines features
of total portfolios, but within a certain range it does not
determine how these portfolios are divided between indi-
vidual investments and those investments made through
the banking system. To explain why banking (at least in
the United States) resembles the outcome that has a large
amount of assets outside the banking system and that has
banking system illiquidity, it is tempting to appeal to two
aspects of bank regulation that are not in the model: the
United States taxes deposits through reserve requirements
and prevents banks from holding some kinds of assets. A
tax on bank deposits would make the equilibrium amount
of deposits even less than the minimum amount described
earlier in connection with the best feasible symmetric out-
come. Restrictions on bank assets could limit the amount
of liabilities that are willingly held and that are subordi-
nate to deposits.
10 In my model the holding of subordinate
liabilities is costless as long as such liabilities do not ex-
ceed the amount required to support the minimum amount
of date 2 consumption. However, that result obtains only
if the banking system is allowed to hold the right assets.
In my version of the Diamond-Dybvig model these assets
are long-term investment; in other versions of the model
they are risky assets.
The third discrepancy is that there is a sense in which
my model does not display the kind of banking difficulties
that inspired the narrow banking proposal: bank panics
and runs. In my model a threatened suspension eliminates
any banking difficulties. However, versions of the Dia-
mond-Dybvig model exist which come closer to display-
ing banking difficulties. One version includes uncertainty
about the proportions of people who are patient and impa-
tient. In some versions the best arrangements have actual
suspensions (as opposed to just threatened suspensions) in
which those people who arrive early do better than those
who arrive late. This situation resembles what is observed
in bank runs. (See, for example, Wallace 1988 and 1990.)
Such versions of the model are no kinder to the narrow
banking proposal than is the version set out here.
More generally, any model that relies on the three
plausible Diamond-Dybvig ingredients to explain banking
system illiquidity will ascribe beneﬁts to having deposits
backed by other than safe short-term assets. For this rea-
son I do not think that the above discrepancies between
the model and the actual economy make a case for narrow
banking. Until advocates of narrow banking provide a
plausible explanation of banking system illiquidity that is
consistent with their proposal, I must conclude that a per-
suasive case for narrow banking has not been made. My
model shows that sufficient justiﬁcation for the proposal
is not given merely by observing that the magnitude of
safe short-term assets outside the banking system exceeds
the magnitude of banks’ demand deposit liabilities. It is
somewhat ironic that, according to my model, assets that
mayplayausefulroleinhelpingovercomepotentialbank-
ing difficulties are not safe, short-term assets but rather
long-term assets, those that are not being used to support
short-term spending.
1As might be expected, there are many versions of the narrow banking proposal.
For a discussion of some of them, see Greenbaum and Thakor 1995 (chaps. 10 and 11
and, in particular, pp. 572–73) and Phillips 1995. There are also long-standing precur-
sors of the current proposal. In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1789, bk. 2, chap.
2) urged bankers to match the maturity structures of their assets and liabilities. For a
discussion of the 100 percent–reserve requirement proposal, see Friedman 1959.
2For example, neither Litan 1987 nor Phillips 1995 cites Diamond and Dybvig
1983 or, for that matter, any model of illiquid banking.
3Measuring illiquidity simply by examining reserves and liabilities of the banking
system may, however, be misleading. If a central bank is committed to aid banks, then
illiquidity should be judged by consolidating over both banks and the central bank.
Also, if bank assets include loans they can call in, then it makes sense to consolidate
over both the banks and those in debt to them. If the debtors can pay their obligations
in a form that satisﬁes the holders of bank liabilities, then the system is less illiquid
than would be indicated by not consolidating over them.
4As will be made clear as I proceed, nothing about the model set out here is new.
5The original version of the model had a single technology; in effect, it assumed
that r1 = R1. The generalization to r1 < R1 was ﬁrst studied by Bhattacharya and Gale
(1987) and by Okuda (1989).
6Formally,Iassumethefollowing:u
i(x,y)isstrictlyincreasingandstrictlyconcave,








2(x,y) for each (x,y), where u
i
j(x,y) denotes the partial derivative of ui with respect to
its jth argument. In the original version of the Diamond-Dybvig model, u
1 and u
2 each
display perfect substitution between consumption at different dates with different mar-
ginal rates of substitution. The more plausible, smooth preferences used here were ﬁrst
introduced into the model by Jacklin (1987).
7The need for some such assumption was ﬁrst pointed out by Jacklin (1987). For
a detailed discussion of the assumption, see Wallace 1988.










2), with b2 > b1. Then it is easy to show that if constraint (5)









2. (Both types receive the same date 1 consumption, while type 2 receives greater date
2 consumption.) However, this would lead both types to claim to be type 2. Thus, for
such preferences—which satisfy my assumptions—the solution with constraint (5) is
different from the one without it.
Notice that the incentive constraints are stated as weak inequalities. The accompa-
nying assumption is that if a person is indifferent between telling the truth and not tell-
ing the truth, then that person tells the truth.
9An important feature of these deposits is that people are offered a choice of two
discrete patterns of payouts; they are not offered interest rates and allowed to withdraw
any amount. This somewhat unrealistic feature can be avoided by changing the model
from one with two types to a more plausible model with a continuum of types. Such
a version of the model is studied by Lin (forthcoming). The implications I point out
here hold also for that version of the model.
10Improperly priced deposit insurance is another explanation. For an analysis of




Here I develop the proofs for the three propositions discussed
in the preceding paper.
PROPOSITION 1. Any solution to the upper bound problem is
such that all date 1 consumption is supported by investment in
the short-term technology and all date 2 consumption is sup-
ported by investment in the long-term technology (so that there
is no liquidation of long-term investment), constraints (1)–(3)
hold at equality, and type 1( impatient) persons receive relative-
ly more date 1 consumption and relatively less date 2 consump-









2* , where an asterisk denotes a solution.)
Proof. The investment claims are obvious. Although the result
about the consumption pairs is well known, a review of the ar-
gument may be instructive. Suppose a solution to the upper
bound problem assigns the consumption pair A in the accompa-
nying chart to type 2, the patient type. I want to show that the
pair assigned to type 1, the impatient type, is within the shaded
region, the region (strictly) southeast of A. I do this by eliminat-
ing every other possibility. The chart shows the indifference
curves for the two types that go through point A. In accord with
my assumption, the patient indifference curve is ﬂatter than the
impatient indifference curve. The pair assigned to the impatient
type cannot be southwest of A because then the impatient type
would prefer A; also, the pair cannot be northeast of A because
then the patient type would prefer that pair to A. In either case,
constraint (5) would be violated. Nor can the pair be northwest
of A. If the pair were, then for the impatient type to be willing
to receive that pair rather than A, the pair would have to be on
or above the impatient indifference curve through A. If so, how-
ever, then the pair would have to be above the patient indiffer-
ence curve through A, which violates constraint (5). Finally, I
show that the pair assigned to the impatient type is not A.
Although such an assignment would satisfy constraint (5),
that assignment cannot solve the maximum problem because









2) for the patient—that satisfy (5), that do not use more re-
sources than A for both, and that make both types better off.
This can be seen as follows. Since the slopes of the indifference
curves through A differ, there exists a line through A with slope
denoted a < 0, which, as shown in the accompanying chart, is
between the two indifference curves near A. The condition that










while the condition that the pairs use the same amount of re-






for j = 1, 2. Thus I have three linear equations in four un-
knowns, a fact that leaves me free to choose the B pairs suffi-
ciently close to A so that they are between the two indifference
curves. This choice will assure that each type is better off than
it would be at A and that constraint (5) holds. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION2. Any solution to the upper bound problem is bet-
ter than the solution to the autarky problem.
Proof. There are two steps to the argument: (a) The consump-
tion 4-tuple that solves the autarky problem is feasible for the
upper bound problem, and (b) any consumption 4-tuple that
solves the upper bound problem is not feasible under autarky.
(a) I denote with two asterisks the solution to the autarky
problem, and I let





which is the weighted average of the amounts of liquidation of
long-term investment underautarky. Since autarky consumption
pairs by deﬁnition satisfy constraint (5), I need only ﬁnd a trip-
let (xs,xl,xl1) so that these and the autarky solution consumption
pairs satisfy (1)–(4). I propose that
(A4) (xs,xl,xl1)=( x s **,xl**,xl1**).
Since (1) is a constraint common to both problems and (4) is
implied by condition (8) and my deﬁnition of xl1**, it remains
only to show that (2) and (3) hold. The weighted average of the
two equations of (6), with weight p on i = 1 and weight (1–p)
on i = 2, implies (2), while the same weighted average of the
two equations of (7) implies (3).
(b) Let c*’s and x*’s be a solution to the upper bound prob-
lem. I know that these satisfy the claims in Proposition 1. I do
a proof by contradiction and suppose that there are x**’s such
that these and the c*’s satisfy the autarky constraints. Again I
let (A3) hold. Since the c*’s are such that the two types receive
different consumption pairs, it follows from (6) that either
xl1* *>0o rx s** > xs*. That is, either there is liquidation under
autarkyorthereismoreinvestment in the short-term technology
under autarky.
Since the x**’s and c*’s satisfy the autarky constraints, it





1* £ R1xs** + r1xl1**.
And since a solution to the upper bound problem satisﬁes (2)
with equality and has no liquidation of long-term investment, it
follows that
(A6) R1xs* £ R1xs** + r1xl1**.
Since R1 > r1, it follows that
(A7) xs** + xl1** – xs* ³ 0.











And since a solution to the upper bound problem satisﬁes (3)
with equality, has all date 2 consumption ﬁnanced by long-term
investment, and has no liquidation of long-term investment, it
follows that
(A9) R2xl* £ R2(xl**–xl1**) + R1(R1xs**+r1xl1**–R1xs*).
This, in turn, can be written as




(A11) xs** + xl1** – xs* ³ 0
and since either xl1* *>0o rx s ** > xs*, it follows that
(A12) R2xl*<R 2 ( x l**+xs**–xs*).
Since the upper bound investments satisfy (1) at equality, it fol-
lows that the autarky investments violate (1), which is a contra-
diction. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION3. If the banking system has no liabilities subordi-
nate to its deposit liabilities and is liquid, then the implied con-
sumption pairs are achievable under autarky.
Proof. For this proof I use an extra subscript to distinguish be-
tween investments made individually and those made through
the bank. I also let d
i
j denote the deposit payout to type i at date
j. In order to be feasible, and given no bank assets subordinate
to deposits, the consumptions are related to these amounts by
(A13) c
i



















for i = 1 and 2, where the subscript a (for autarkic) denotes in-
vestment made individually. If the banking system is liquid,
then it can accommodate any pattern of withdrawals by appro-
priate asset liquidations. In particular, it can accommodate a pat-
tern in which everyone claims to be type 1, with asset liquida-
tion denoted x
1
lb1, and a pattern in which everyone claims to be
type 2, with asset liquidation denoted x
2
lb1, where the subscript
b (for bank) denotes investment made through the bank. That is,
for i = 1 and 2 I have that
(A15) d
i













If I add R1xsa + r1x
i
la1 to each side of (A15) and use (A13), then
I get (6); while if I add
(A17) R2(xla–x
i







to each side of (A16) and use (A14), then I get (7). Therefore,
the consumption pairs are feasible under autarky. Q.E.D.
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